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ABSTRACT 
This article provides scholars studying frontline judgements an analytical framework – the 
signaling perspective – that could be used to examine how street-level bureaucrats evaluate 
unobservable citizen-client properties. It proposes to not only look at the kind of signals and cues 
officials gather, but also at the interpretive frames used to make sense of them. This offers a 
valuable contribution to the street-level bureaucracy literature, which largely focuses on 
explaining discretionary decision making by looking at the influence of officials’ personal 
preferences or client characteristics, but less on officials’ interpretive frameworks to make sense 
of client characteristics. The analytical framework is illustrated by applying it to existing literature 
on trustworthiness judgements of social workers and police officers. Different interpretive frames 
were found from which frontline officials interpret citizen characteristics as signals. The article 
concludes by offering several avenues for future research.  
 
 
Keywords: signaling perspective; analytical framework; street-level bureaucrats; frontline 
evaluation; uncertainty  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A trend of declining citizen trust in government has become of fundamental concern within public 
administration literature (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Jennings 1998; Kim 2010; Nye, Zelikow 
and King 1997; Van de Walle et al. 2008). The underlying assumption is that public trust has 
declined because governments do not work properly, are not transparent or not ethical (Van de 
Walle & Bouckaert 2003). However, it could be argued that citizens’ trust in government is not 
merely based on an assessment of public officials by citizens, but is also related to the trust 
governments have in citizens: “citizens will not trust public administrators if they know or feel 
that public officials do not trust them” (Yang 2005: 273).  
 
Hence, the interaction between public officials and citizens has come to the forefront and is 
increasingly seen as a valuable phenomenon in itself (Bruhn and Ekström 2015). The public 
encounter, the place where officials and citizens meet, is seen as crucial aspect in fostering trust, 
commitment and collaboration between public officials and citizens (Bartels 2013), which in turn 
could help to democratize and legitimate the state (Peters 2004). This is not only discernable in 
social welfare agencies, but also in organizations engaged in the more traditional regulation and 
law enforcement functions of government, such as inspection agencies and tax administrations 
(e.g. Burgemeestre et al. 2010; Leviner 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Sakurai 2002). 
 
Moreover, faced with excessive red tape and high legal bills associated with deterrence 
mechanisms, many governments are gradually developing governance approaches based on 
cooperation and trust. For frontline bureaucrats, such a change from a command-and-control 
approach to a trust-based approach is quite a change. They are expected not to strictly enforce the 
law or implement policy, but to be responsive towards citizen-clients, i.e. to adapt their decisions 
to the citizen-client behavior they encounter in interactions (Mascini and Van Wijk 2009). Street-
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level bureaucrats have to judge whether the citizen or client they are dealing with is trustworthy 
or not, or is risky or not. Such notions are moreover not predetermined by rules, but left open to 
street-level bureaucrats to flesh out in practice (e.g. Dubois 2014; Evans 2015). It is however not 
clear how officials come to evaluate such unobservable properties.  
 
Within this article we propose that a signaling perspective may provide scholars an analytical 
framework to examine how street-level bureaucrats construct an image of citizen-clients in 
uncertain situations. We illustrate the usefulness of this perspective in examining street-level 
evaluation of unobservable citizen characteristics by applying it to existing scholarly literature on 
social service encounters and police encounters. Our illustration shows how street-level 
bureaucrats determine citizen-clients’ trustworthiness by looking at signals and cues. In doing 
this, officials gain insight in unobservable properties without the search costs (time and effort) 
that would have been needed for a substantiated account. We moreover show that the signals and 
cues do not have a meaning on their own, but are dependent on different frames from which 
officials interpret these cues. 
 
The aim of this theoretical article is twofold. First, it offers scholars an analytical framework that 
could be used to examine how street-level bureaucrats evaluate unobservable citizen properties. 
It thereby proposes to not only look at the kind of signals and cues officials gather, but also at the 
interpretive frames used to make sense of them. This offers a valuable contribution to the street-
level bureaucracy literature, which does focus on the impact of officials’ personal preferences 
(e.g. Hupe and Buffat 2014; May and Winter 2009; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003), and 
client characteristics (e.g. Goodsell 1981; Vinzant and Crothers 1998) on discretion but less on 
the possible interpretive frameworks which give these characteristics a ‘signaling status’, i.e. the 
ways in which these characteristics become meaningful signals for officials. Second, the article 
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offers substantive insight in how unobservable citizen trustworthiness is assessed by social 
workers and police officers. This may be of interest for scholars examining collaborative and 
interactive forms of governance, where trust between officials and citizens is seen as an essential 
element for collaboration. It may also be of interest to scholars interested in decision making by 
street-level bureaucrats, for whom, as we will argue in the next section, evaluations of honesty 
and trustworthiness are part and parcel of their daily job.  
 
In what follows, we will first argue that using a signaling theory perspective to analyze street-
level bureaucrats’ search for and interpretation of signals and cues is warranted, by showing the 
prominence of uncertainty in street-level decision making. After that we will show how such a 
perspective may yield interesting insights in how officials create images of citizen-clients in 
uncertain situations, by applying it to existing literature on judgements by social workers and 
police officers. For illustrative purposes we look at judgements about citizen-clients’ 
unobservable trustworthiness. The article ends with a discussion of the implications for public 
sector organizations and of the wider applicability of the analytical framework to study frontline 
evaluation and decision making.  
 
BUREAUCRATS’ USE OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND SEARCH FOR SIGNALS  
 
Bureaucrats’ interactions with citizens have traditionally been studied within the literature on 
street-level bureaucracies. These studies generally focus on how public officials make use of their 
discretion in making decisions and, thus, in distributing services. It is commonly held that a street-
level bureaucrat’s main responsibility is to transform citizens into clients, which is “actualized 
via the decision to categorize a client in one way or another” (Prottas 1979: 4). In fact, it is held 
that public organizations need to classify citizen-clients according to their organizational schemes 
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in order to be able to direct assistance to them and to reduce complexity (Garsten and Jacobsson 
2013). This categorization decision can be based on routine decisions, thereby relying on rules 
and procedures, but can also be based on moral judgements regarding the worthiness or 
deservingness of clients (Prottas 1979; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Dubois 2013; 
Hasenfeld 2000). The act of categorizing citizens is held to be an ambiguous and uncertain 
process (Raaphorst 2017). Considering the fact that these policies and rules are never “specific 
enough to fit a local context, bureaucrats’ work is to interpret them” (Hoag 2011: 82). It is has 
been shown that, due to a lack of information, time and other resources, street-level bureaucrats 
develop shortcuts such as stereotypes to categorize clients (Lipsky 2010; Prottas 1979). They 
employ “social typologies of their clients” (Mennerick 1974: 398). These typologies provide 
strategic information where formal categories are lacking and allow frontline workers to act 
during initial encounters with citizen-clients which may be pervaded by uncertainty and fear on 
the part of workers. 
 
The literature has paid remarkably little attention to the question how individual bureaucrats 
know that they have to do with a certain ‘type of citizen-client’. It has been argued that frontline 
workers look for certain cues or signals stemming from citizen-clients, which warrant workers 
they are facing a certain ‘type of citizen-client’ (e.g. Mennerick 1974). Based on this, workers 
can form their expectations about citizen-clients’ likely identity and behavior, and can adjust 
their behavior and decision-making accordingly. A study conducted by Diego Gambetta and 
Heather Hamill (2005) shows how taxi drivers, who need to decide quickly on the basis of only 
little information, assess observable signs of customers they believe to be related to 
unobservable trust-warranting and distrust-warranting properties, in order to distinguish a 
genuine customer from a villain. Following this signaling perspective, taxi drivers look for 
reliable signs, which are too costly for a mimic to fake but costless for a true possessor to 
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display, given the benefit that each might expect (see Henslin 1968 for a similar study). This 
study shows that signals or cues that are considered important by taxi drivers stem from 
different ‘sources of knowledge’: statistical discrimination, experience, causal knowledge and 
gut feeling.  
 
Statistical discrimination entails category-based discrimination: “being a member of a category 
that is statistically more or less dangerous is a type of trust- or distrust-warranting quality, and 
taxi drivers look for the signs of membership in those categories” (Gambetta and Hamill 2005: 
195). It means that decisions are made based on a group’s average behavior. Picking up signals 
based on experience entails having knowledge about certain passengers based on assumptions 
about the constancy of a certain trait or quality experienced. Causal knowledge entails applying 
causal theories, even without previous experience or knowledge of statistical risks. Lastly, this 
study points to the role of drivers’ gut feelings or instinct in assessing passengers’ 
trustworthiness, and in particular, deception: “facial expressions, looks in the eyes, and tone of 
voice were mentioned as properties that, in their experience, betray a passenger’s true mood 
and intent” (ibid: 217). However, the authors argue, the drivers were not always able to pinpoint 
which signs prompted their suspicion.  
 
Certain signals or cues, thus, get ascribed a ‘certainty status’ due to mechanisms that indicate 
that it is highly likely that the observed signs are linked to the looked for unobservable 
properties. It is exactly these mechanisms that are interesting to look at, since these constitute 
the heart of frontline workers’ epistemological work, which provides them a sense of certainty 
in situations characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Signals and cues do not have 
meaning in themselves; displaying particular characteristics or attributes associated with a 
lower socio-economic class, for instance, does not necessarily raise police officers’ suspicion. 
7 
 
They get meaning because they are linked, for instance, to certain stereotypes regarding what 
constitutes ‘a villain’, or with causal beliefs regarding the behavior of certain groups of people. 
Exploring these mechanisms, thus, uncovers the meaningful reasoning that links frontline 
workers’ epistemological work in assessing signals and cues to the categories that are employed 
to classify citizen-clients. These mechanisms, in a sense, constitute the interpretive framework 
from which frontline workers discern and judge signals and cues. Thus, to understand why 
certain signals and cues are linked to certain unobservable characteristics, and noticed in the 
first place, we need to look at frontline workers’ interpretive frameworks.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE AND MEANING OF TRUSTWORTHINESS EVALUATIONS  
 
In this article we will illustrate the usefulness of the signaling perspective to analyze street-level 
bureaucrats’ evaluations of unobservable citizen characteristics, by applying it to literature on 
social welfare encounters and police encounters. Before doing this, we first need to discuss the 
importance of trustworthiness assessments in street-level work more generally, and what it 
entails to assess citizens’ trustworthiness in the respective fields more specifically. Since police 
officers have to deal with different kinds of citizens than social workers, citizen trustworthiness 
has a different meaning.  
 
Trustworthiness in street-level bureaucracy  
 
Street-level bureaucracy scholars have pointed out that how frontline workers act and respond to 
citizens is in large part dependent upon their perceptions of citizens. Street-level bureaucracy 
research has shown that bureaucrats’ discretionary practices are not only informed by 
organizational classification systems and rules, but also by personal judgements regarding clients’ 
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worthiness or deservingness, based on cultural schemes, moral beliefs and values, or certain 
stereotypes (Dubois 2013; Harrits and Møller 2014; Hasenfeld 2000; Kingfisher 1998; Lipsky 
2010; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Mennerick 1974; Prottas 1979). Bureaucrats may 
assign citizens to social identities or cultural groups and when fixed, “these identities shape the 
nature of street-level workers’ responses, from bending the rules and providing extraordinary 
assistance to allowing only begrudging and minimal help and at times abuse” (Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno 2003: 154). The latter authors show how the act of categorizing citizens is bound 
up with questions of citizens’ trustworthiness and honesty. They show how frontline workers 
suspend the judgement about citizens’ worthiness by first giving a routine response, and how, 
after sensing elements of worth, they start testing the citizen-client and watch how s/he responds. 
After passing this “crucial test of honesty” (p. 120), citizen-clients have acquired the status of 
worthy.  
 
The account of frontline workers as state-agents assumes that “deviations are allowable only if 
workers adapt law to the circumstances of cases in a manner consistent with policy and 
hierarchical authority” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003: 4). Contrary to this account of 
frontline workers, studies argue that we should not perceive of bureaucrats’ work as a form of 
policy implementation, but as an institutionalized practice (Maynard-Moody, Epp and Portillo 
2014; Musheno and Maynard-Moody 2015), or as a form of cultural abidance (Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno 2003), where frontline workers are driven by cultural norms rather than the 
application of abstract rules (ibid). In this vein, it becomes all the more relevant to study frontline 
workers’ categorizations of citizen-clients; if workers are not referring to rules or policies in their 
daily work, but make cultural judgements in everyday interactions with citizen-clients, social 
categories become more prominent. Moreover, public sector organizations increasingly promote 
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values as cooperation and trust, which are, in the end, played out in the interactions between 
bureaucrats and citizen-clients.  
 
What happens at the official/client interface, then, determines whether trust or cooperation will 
indeed occur (Brown and Calnan 2013). If public sector organizations’ adoption of horizontal 
approaches and other delivery models to which mutual collaboration are central rather than 
command-and-control are to succeed, civil servants and citizen-clients need to be, at least, willing 
to trust and be open to each other. The perceptions civil servants have of their citizen-clients, and 
vice versa, likely determines the course of an interaction (Van de Walle & Lahat 2016). Exploring 
the categories frontline workers use to define a trustworthy or untrustworthy citizen-client and 
the signals and cues they rely upon, is a modest attempt at assessing how civil servants’ work 
practices and perceptions are compatible or incompatible with these policies. 
 
First, we scrutinized studies within the street-level bureaucracy literature focused on encounters 
between social workers and citizen-clients. Traditionally, these street-level bureaucracies have 
been engaged in defining categories of neediness, in order to be able to determine citizen-clients 
eligibility and to provide for needy people (Stone 1984). They regulate access to government 
services. It is held that to determine disability has always been problematic (Stone 1984: 23). 
Since it is assumed that people have incentives to escape the labor market (ibid.: 23), assessing 
citizen-clients’ trustworthiness and honesty has always been part and parcel of frontline workers’ 
neediness or deservingness judgements. 
 
Second, we focused on studies on police encounters, mainly from within the field of criminology, 
social psychology and sociology. Within these disciplines, much research has been done on patrol 
officers’ decisions to stop a citizen, and whether and to what extent these stops resulted in arrests 
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or other formal interventions (Dunham et al. 2005; Johnson and Morgan 2013). Considerable 
attention has also been paid to the process of suspicion formation, which “is a police officer’s 
initial decision to suspect that someone is involved in illegal behavior” (Alpert et al. 2005: 408). 
Suspicion formation is, thus, the social process taking place prior to decisions to either stop, 
search or arrest suspects. These studies point out that police officers assess citizens on how 
suspicious their behavior and demeanor comes across. This means that patrol officers, in the end, 
are also preoccupied with the question whether citizens are trustworthy and honest in how they 
behave and what they tell.  
 
What are trustworthy and untrustworthy citizen-clients? 
  
For service workers, the assessment of citizen-clients’ trustworthiness seems to play at two 
different levels. The first is short-term and is considered a dimension of moral worth: “morally 
worthy citizen-clients do not try to con or scam workers or the system” (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003: 104). It is held that citizen-clients, even with genuine needs, “who try to 
manipulate the system for undue advantage are labeled troublemakers” (ibid: 104). Although 
these citizen-clients are not withheld the services, workers do not go out of their way to help 
the manipulative and over-demanding citizen-clients. Such citizen-clients are viewed with 
suspicion, since they might be driven by other reasons, beyond a ‘real disability’, to apply for 
a service. Thus, also citizen-clients with ‘genuine needs’, who therefore have a reason to apply 
for a service, might be defined as ‘deceitful claimants’ when they are manipulative.  
 
The other level at which the assessment of trustworthiness occurs is with an eye towards the 
future; worthy clients are seen as good investments (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). This 
dimension is seen as a summative judgement: ”if citizen-clients have genuine needs, are of good 
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character, and are motivated to respond to treatment, then they are likely to repay society for 
street-level workers’ investments of time, effort and money” (ibid: 106). Frontline workers are, 
thus, willing to extend their services only to those citizen-clients they believe have the 
motivation and capacity to repay the investment. In this sense, they trust those citizen-clients to 
make workers’ investment worth the effort. Central to this summative judgement is a citizen-
client’s motivation to improve or change.  
 
Some scholars point to the importance of the frame of reference frontline workers adhere to in 
providing services. Different perceptions of entitlement entail different ways of approaching 
citizen-clients. Eikenaar et al. (2015) show that defining citizen-clients as needy persons who 
need to be helped primarily occurs within ‘the caring frame of reference’. Frontline workers 
having a ‘procedural frame of reference’, on the contrary, approach citizen-clients to the extent 
they obey the rules. Hence, distrust seems omnipresent: ”You are guilty, unless proven 
otherwise” (ibid: 9). Studies on active labor market policy show that caseworkers perceive of 
deserving citizen-clients as having a will to work and as adhering to the value of contribution, 
whereas undeserving citizen-clients are viewed as those clients who have a lack of motivation 
to work and do not want to contribute to society (Møller and Stone 2013). This aligns with the 
‘learning frame of reference’ (Eikenaar et al. 2015), where citizen-clients’ own responsibility 
and capacity is stressed. These workers do not want to ‘take care’ of a citizen-client, but to 
motivate them to take action themselves, and to improve their competences. Bureaucrats 
working from a ‘work focused frame of reference’ do not take formal rules as directive, but aim 
to get the citizen-client back to work. Whereas the possibility for deception is ever present, 
these workers try to avoid approaching a citizen-client distrustfully, since it works 
counterproductive for them (Eikenaar et al. 2015). They might be rather interested in why 
citizen-clients are unwilling or uncooperative (ibid). Within the ‘facilitating frame of 
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reference’, frontline workers have a “basic trust in the client’s competences” (ibid: 14), and act 
as mere service providers. For this reason, they do not scrutinize citizen-clients’ characters, 
statements and circumstances.  
 
Frontline workers’ categorizations of citizen-clients are, thus, not simply ‘out there’ to pick 
when they encounter certain citizen-clients. Rather, how a citizen-client is defined is dependent 
upon the frame of reference adhered to. This frame of reference could be constituted by how 
bureaucrats perceive of their task (e.g. I am here to enforce the rules versus I am here to help 
people), but also by the policy field they work in. Whereas some frames encourage workers to 
scrutinize citizen-clients’ reasons for applying and their circumstances, other frames of 
reference let workers believe that citizen-clients are always to be trusted or, to the contrary, 
never to be trusted. A frontline worker with a procedural frame of reference thus believes every 
citizen-client is a potential deceiver, whereas a worker with a facilitating frame of reference 
believes there is no reason to doubt a citizen-client’s intentions.  
 
Moreover, the respective frames of reference are also likely to have implications for how 
citizen-clients’ long-term trustworthiness is perceived. From within the learning frame of 
reference workers believe that citizen-clients’ competences and behavioral structure are more 
fluid, and that citizen-clients need to be encouraged to take responsibility and use their own 
capacities to the full (Eikenaar et al. 2015). These workers are likely to believe that, if citizen-
clients have taken responsibility for their own problems, they have the capacity to pay back 
society for the frontline worker’s time and effort. If a worker, on the contrary, attributes a 
citizen-client’s situation to the poor circumstances s/he is in or to a lack of motivation, the 
worker is likely to think the citizen-client is less inclined to pay back society in the long run 
due to structural impediments.  
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The literature on the formation of patrol officers’ suspicion is less extensive about the 
categorizations used to classify citizen-clients as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Citizen-clients 
who are viewed with suspicion are generally perceived of as having a potential for violence or 
criminal activity (Johnson and Morgan 2013; Alpert et al. 2005). Suspicion formation is bound 
up with the perception of the risk of danger and criminality (Stroshine et al. 2008). Some 
reference is made about what, according to police officers, constitutes a citizen-client with a 
bad moral character: s/he is disrespectful, aggressive and ill-mannered towards police officers 
(Alpert et al. 2005; Stroshine et al. 2008). A Danish study points out that police jargon 
designates the citizen-clients with a bad moral character as ‘assholes’, ‘asses’ or ‘regular 
customers’, whereas the rest of the population is referred to as “Mr and Mrs Denmark” 
(Holmberg 2000). However, rich descriptions of the motivations and characters of ‘morally 
bad’ citizens and other categories of citizens are virtually absent. A possible explanation of this 
is that police officers usually have little time to decide whether to stop someone, where 
classifications beyond the simple binary ‘posing a risk’ or ‘not posing a risk’ would probably 
not be feasible and possibly make the task even harder.  
 
In short, the two research traditions on encounters between officials and citizen-clients have a 
different focus. A trustworthy citizen-client is perceived of at different levels (short-term and 
long-term), from different frames of reference, in different contexts. Service workers seem to 
be preoccupied with both short-term trustworthiness as long-term trustworthiness, based on the 
rich assessments of citizen-clients’ moral character. Depending on the frame of reference, 
frontline workers either look at motivations, competences or circumstances. Categorizations 
relied upon by police officers seem more ‘flat’ entailing a binary of good versus bad citizen-
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clients. This could be due to the little time officers have to decide whether to stop someone, and 
the higher risk involved when they decide not to stop a potentially dangerous or bad person.  
 
EXEMPLIFYING THE SIGNALING PERSPECTIVE: TRUSTWORTHINESS SIGNALS AND 
THEIR INTERPRETATION 
 
What observable characteristics do frontline workers look for and what do these characteristics 
signal them about the unobservable trustworthiness of citizen-clients? We have seen that an 
assessment of a citizen-client’s motivation to change or improve is central to frontline workers’ 
judgement of moral worth. The manner in which bureaucrats assess this motivation is by 
looking at the co-operation there are getting from citizen-clients (e.g. Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). When frontline workers get the feeling citizen-clients are really trying, they 
show they have the motivation to improve the situation. In another study, this ‘trying’ or rather 
‘not trying’ is discerned by frontline workers when citizen-clients are missing a spark to sell 
themselves, or when there is no sign of movement (Møller and Stone 2013). Co-operation and 
‘trying’ on the part of citizen-clients, regardless of their genuine need, then, signal frontline 
workers are dealing with worthy citizens, who are good investments in the long run.  
 
The perception of who is co-operative and really trying is, however, not exempt from 
stereotypical beliefs regarding citizen-clients’ socio-economic status, health status and family 
history. When a citizen-client applying for social assistance displays middle-class attributes, 
there is no suspicion of the client’s motives; s/he is viewed as a good citizen-client who fell 
apart (Møller and Stone 2013). Moreover, when there are signs of a mental illness, and when 
there has already been a family history of mental illness, case workers are inclined to believe 
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that the mental illness is real (ibid). The use of stereotypes or ‘flat identities’ to get a grip on 
citizen-clients could be explained by the uncertain character of initial encounters which 
“represent the social terrain in which workers tend to identify who people are by employing 
stigmatizing identity categories” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003: 83). Within sustained 
encounters, on the contrary, workers construct thick accounts of who people are (ibid).  
 
The rather short-term trustworthiness of citizen-clients is also of relevance; manipulative 
citizen-clients, as we have seen, are seen as untrustworthy and as trying to con workers. 
Frontline workers know they are dealing with this type of citizen-client when they are either 
presenting themselves as manipulative, or as helpless (e.g. Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
2003). The manipulative persons have a spoiled and demanding attitude (if I want it, I should 
get it), whereas the helpless persons are whiny and dependent (poor me, I need this help). 
Citizen-clients demeanor in the conversation with the frontline worker, thus, provide workers 
cues as to whether they are trying to cheat the system. Another strategy employed is by looking 
at possible discrepancies between a citizen-client’s story and reality as frontline workers 
observe it. For instance, someone says s/he is not able to walk because of a bone fracture, but 
frontline workers observe the citizen-client walking without any problem (Møller and Stone 
2013).  
 
Thus, in order to assess long-term trustworthiness, frontline workers primarily look at citizen-
clients’ cooperativeness and at how hard they are trying, as signs of being motivated. The 
literature also suggests that stereotypes might influence how certain characteristics are 
interpreted. A middle-class person ‘trying very hard’ might be perceived as more (trust)worthy 
than a low-class person ‘trying very hard’, because there is a belief that there is no reason to 
have doubts about a middle-class person’s motivation in the first place. Moreover, it is also 
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conceivable that certain characteristics have a signaling function for one frontline worker, 
whereas they do not mean anything or signal something very different to another frontline 
worker, depending upon how one perceives one’s core task. For a state-agent, focused on 
implementing the law, a citizen-client’s unwillingness to cooperate might indicate obstinacy 
and disobedience, whereas to a frontline worker with a ‘learning frame of reference’, it might 
indicate that the citizen-client just needs to be confronted with his own attitude, so s/he changes 
his/her view (e.g. Eikenaar et al. 2015).  
 
While the literature on suspicion formation shows that police officers employ rather flat images 
of citizen-clients as either bad or good, or as constituting a risk for potential criminal activity 
or not, the ways they get to know whether they are facing a bad or good citizen-client are 
variegated. Within the literature on police encounters, the frames of reference have a more 
situational and practical character since patrolling police officers seem to be primarily 
preoccupied with determining ‘short-term trustworthiness’ (see also the work on riot police by 
Morrell and Currie, 2015). The approaches or procedures relied upon help them to distinguish 
deviance from normality. Four approaches or procedures are distinguished: stereotypical 
reasoning, incongruence procedure, having prior knowledge, and observing nonverbal cues.  
 
First, stereotypes regarding socio-economic status, race, sex, age, dress and even hygiene lead 
police officers to believe they have to do with a potential criminal. Arab motorists, for instance, 
are looked at with suspicion, because of the belief that they are potential terrorists (Johnson and 
Morgan 2013). There is also the stereotype of young, male, African-Americans being potential 
criminals (ibid; Stroshine et al. 2008). The same goes for people who look scruffy and are 
shabbily clothed (Johnson and Morgan 2013). Besides appearance of citizen-clients, police 
officers look at vehicle appearance; old vehicles in poor condition are looked at with suspicion, 
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because of the belief that criminals own dilapidated vehicles, and cars with tinted windows 
signal police officers that the motorist may attempt to hide something (Johnson and Morgan 
2013; Dunham et al. 2005; Stroshine et al. 2008). 
 
Second, police officers’ stereotypical reasoning is highly intertwined with another approach to 
observe deviance, namely ‘the incongruence procedure’ (Sacks 1972; Alpert et al. 2005; 
Dunham et al. 2005; Holmberg 2000; Johnson and Morgan 2013; Stroshine et al. 2008). This 
method is based on the assumption that people use the way other people look as a basis for 
dealing with them in public places. Police officers learn to recognize what is ‘normal’ behavior 
and demeanor at given times and places. Anything or anyone that is out of the ordinary, 
therefore, is suspect and a possible subject of investigation. An example is a suspect not looking 
at the police car spotlight, whereas the normal reaction would have been to shield one’s eyes 
and trying to assess what and who is shining the light (Johnson and Morgan 2013). This is a 
deviance from what is deemed normal behavior. Sometimes the incongruence is interlinked 
with stereotypical beliefs, such as having suspicions when observing a shabbily dressed young 
man driving an expensive new car (ibid). This deviates from normality, in that this type of men 
normally do not drive such cars, but it also constitutes a stereotypical belief about what these 
types of men can possibly possess.  
 
The incongruence procedure is not only applied to persons’ behavior, but also to vehicle 
appearance. For instance, a dirty car with a clean license plate raises police officers’ suspicion, 
suggesting that the plate belonged to another car, or a vehicle with an excessive number of air 
fresheners, signaling them that the driver tries to mask the smell of illegal drugs (ibid). The 
incongruence procedure is mostly tied to assumptions of normality regarding the place and time 
of the day a police officer is observing a suspect. For instance, white men driving slowly 
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through an Afro-Caribbean neighborhood, signals the police officers they are probably trying 
to purchase drugs or pick up a prostitute (Johnson and Morgan 2013; Stroshine et al. 2008). 
Another example that is perceived of as incongruent by police officers is black people driving 
in dilapidated cars in white neighborhoods between 9 AM and 12 PM, suggesting they might 
be ready to burgle a house (Stroshine et al. 2008). The incongruence procedure, thus, indicates 
what is odd at a particular place, with a specific car or a person’s behavior, when compared 
with what might be normally expected.  
 
Third, police officers also look at nonverbal cues in suspects’ demeanor that are associated with 
lying and other forms of deceptive behavior, such as avoidance of eye contact (Johnson and 
Morgan 2013; Alpert et al. 2005; Stroshine et al. 2008), frequent speech interruptions (Johnson 
and Morgan 2013), grandiose hand gestures (ibid; Alpert et al. 2005), speaking at a faster rate 
and using a greater range of voice (Alpert et al. 2005). In a sense, looking at nonverbal cues 
could also be seen as an incongruence procedure; demeanor such as avoiding eye contact or 
speaking at a faster rate indicates that someone might be unusually nervous. 
 
The fourth procedure employed by police officers to assess whether to trust or distrust a person 
is by relying on existing knowledge regarding a suspect’s car (such as expired tags, stolen 
vehicle lists) (Stroshine et al. 2008), or the status of a suspect (prior arrests, lengthy criminal 
record) (ibid; Johnson and Morgan 2013), or the status of certain areas (area known for 
burglaries, drugs or prostitution) (Stroshine et al. 2008; Johnson and Morgan 2013; Dunham et 
al. 2005). When citizen demeanor and action is interpreted in light of prior knowledge about 
him or her, these mainly negative statuses serve as signals; prior behavior is extrapolated to 
someone’s possible future behavior. This also applies to known ‘bad’ areas; citizens in known 
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drug areas or areas known for burglaries are looked at with suspicion because of the status of 
the area.  
 
The literature, thus, shows that police officers look at various things when patrolling a 
neighborhood, such as a citizen-client’s appearance, behavior, demeanor, the appearance of 
his/her vehicle and where and at what time s/he is observed. Again, the observed characteristics 
only get their meaning from within certain interpretive frameworks which give these 
characteristics a signaling status. Table 1 gives an overview of the different interpretive 
frameworks that are found, and illustrates how certain characteristics get their status as signals 
within the respective frameworks.  
 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
This article proposed a signaling perspective to the study of frontline evaluation of 
unobservable citizen characteristics. The analytical framework was exemplified by applying it 
to the literature on welfare encounters and police-citizen encounters. This illustration has shown 
that officials assess citizen trustworthiness, which is an unobservable characteristic, by looking 
at observable characteristics such as citizens’ demeanor and background characteristics. We 
have seen that social workers look at a short-term and long-term trustworthiness. Citizen-clients 
who try to manipulate the system are seen as untrustworthy. Bureaucrats look at citizen-clients’ 
attitude and demeanor in the interaction to assess whether they are manipulative or not. But also 
when it comes to assessing long-term trustworthiness, i.e. whether citizen-clients are likely to 
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pay society back for the worker’s time and effort, workers look at their attitude and demeanor 
in the interaction. Citizen-clients’ cooperativeness and ‘efforts of trying’ are perceived as signs 
of motivation. Police officers tend to rely upon rather flat categorizations of either good or bad 
citizens but employ variegated ways to assess whether citizens are suspect or not, by looking at 
citizens’ appearance, demeanor and attitude.  
 
We moreover explored how such characteristics get their status as signals by looking at the 
frames that give them meaning. The meaning of signals and cues does not stand alone. It is in 
the eye of the beholder: whether certain signals or cues are perceived as either warranting a 
trustworthy or untrustworthy citizen-client depends upon the interpretive frameworks of the 
respective frontline workers. Our exemplification of the signaling perspective as analytical 
framework has shown that social workers and police officers may use various interpretive 
frameworks that link observable characteristics to unobservable characteristics: 1) entitlement 
perceptions (social workers): variation in perceptions of when someone is entitled to service, 
leading to different categorizations of citizen-clients; 2) normality assumptions (police 
officers), where deviations from what is held to be normal demeanor and attitude are viewed 
with suspicion; 3) stereotypical reasoning (social workers, police officers), where possessing 
certain characteristics signal belonging to a certain social group which has certain beliefs 
attached to it; 4) prior knowledge (police officers), where citizen demeanor that accords with 
negative prior information about that citizen leads to suspicion. Interpretive frameworks, thus, 
vary in scope with some being profession-specific and others being shared by society at large.  
 
This article has introduced a signaling perspective as analytical framework for researchers 
interested in studying frontline judgement. It proposes not only to look at the kinds of signals 
officials look at to asses not directly observable citizen properties, but also at the ways in which 
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such characteristics are interpreted as signals. This small-scale review of police officers’ and 
social workers’ trustworthiness evaluations possibly pointed to only a few of the interpretive 
frameworks frontline officials may use in interpreting citizen characteristics and behavior. 
Future research could empirically examine the different interpretive frameworks officials may 
use to interpret such characteristics, and the varying degrees of certainty they derive from these 
frameworks. This would give insight in why officials look at certain characteristics and not at 
others. Also, the analytical framework could be extended to study the evaluation of other types 
of unobservable characteristics such as competence, or deservingness, since trustworthiness is 
only a fraction of the judgments that frontline officials need to make.  
 
Moreover, whereas the ‘signaling perspective’ as analytical framework offers researchers a way 
of studying and looking at frontline judgements in uncertain contexts, it is not a theory in itself. 
The framework could harbor different theories that aim to explain how and why officials 
interpret citizen characteristics and demeanor as signals for unobservable properties. A 
possibility may be signaling theory (e.g. Spence 1973; Gambetta and Hamill 2005) that posits 
that evaluators mainly gather costly signals, i.e. signals that are hard to fake by senders (such 
as their sex), because they offer more certainty than signals that are more easily manipulated 
(such as demeanor). The sociological status characteristics theory (e.g. Ridgeway 1991) to 
mention another example, may be tested to explain why officials look at certain stereotypical 
signals in interactions characterized by uncertainty. Future research could also develop theories 
explaining how normality perceptions affect the interpretation of citizen characteristics (see 
Harrits & Møller 2013 for a good first step in examining this in a frontline context). 
 
Frontline public sector workers encounter countless situations where judgement is required and 
where they have to deal with uncertainty. Prior research has shown that uncertainty is part and 
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parcel of frontline work (Dubois 2014), and that frontline officials are geared at finding proof 
supporting their interpretations rather than finding out every detail of ‘the truth’ (Raaphorst 
2017). Signals thus seem to provide officials a quick sense of certainty in these sometimes 
highly uncertain interactions. This underlines the importance of studying how officials gather 
and interpret such signals. Being judged as untrustworthy – regardless of the question whether 
it is justified or not – brings with it important implications for the citizen-client in terms of 
treatment, access and benefits. Efforts to deregulate and to give public officials the opportunity 
to use their own professional judgement may further increase the need for uncertainty reduction 
based on judgements of the citizen-client’s trustworthiness. Given the fact that frontline public 
officials are often encouraged to rely on their own judgments about undetermined client 
properties (such as trustworthiness, risk and compliance), it is important to study how frontline 
public officials interpret signals in making decisions about citizen-clients.  
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Table 1. Different interpretive frameworks  
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Interpretive frameworks How do characteristics 
become signals? 
Examples 
Stereotyping Being a member of a social 
group (discerned through 
observable characteristics) 
that is generally believed to 
be more or less trustworthy 
(stereotype) 
Middle-class social 
assistance applicants as 
signal for citizens with good 
motivations (Møller and 
Stone 2013) 
 
Young, male, African-
Americans as signal for 
potential criminals (Johnson 
and Morgan 2013; Stroshine 
et al. 2008) 
Entitlement perceptions  Citizen demeanor (discerned 
in the interaction) that does 
or does not accord with 
entitlement perceptions 
Non-cooperative citizen 
behavior as signal for 
disobedience for rule-
focused officials  
Incongruence procedure Citizen characteristics and 
demeanor that do not accord 
with normality perceptions 
about behavior in that 
particular situation, time or 
place  
Citizen not reacting to 
police spot light or avoiding 
officers as signal for having 
something to hide (Johnson 
and Morgan 2013; Dunham 
et al. 2005) 
 
Blacks in cars in White 
neighborhoods between 9 
AM and 12 PM as signal for 
potential intention to rob a 
house (Stroshine et al. 
2008) 
Prior knowledge Negative prior citizen or area 
information extrapolated to 
potential future behavior  
Person known for prior 
arrest as signal for future 
criminal behavior (Johnson 
and Morgan 2013; Stroshine 
et al. 2008) 
 
 
